Causation is Macroscopic but Not Papineau – – In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Herbert Feigl was an Austrian-born logical empiricist philosopher who published the .. Or, as Feigl puts it in “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’”. Herbert Feigl was a Regents’ professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota and director of the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science.

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The Free Press, pp.

Thomas Kroedel – – Philosophical Studies 1: It was in the book Theorie und Erfahrung in der Physik that Feigl reflected on the philosophical significance of quantum mechanics.

Causation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible. Together with Albert E. Now Professor Feigl takes account of the critical discussions and presents his own comments with respect to the most important points raised in the criticisms.

He died of cancer on June 1,in Minneapolis. How Science Tracks TruthLondon: Their brilliant and powerful arguments overwhelmed me temporarily. It is often lumped together with the views of U. How to cite this entry. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.

The Mental and the Physical — University of Minnesota Press

University of Minnesota Press. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der WissenschaftsphilosophieCham: As concerns the relationship between ethics and logic, Feigl draws a principled distinction between two kinds of justification: The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’: Preface to Postscript pp.

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Here, they saw the principle advantage over previous, traditional, empiricist accounts of logic and mathematics. In the footnote attached to this passage, Feigl refers the reader to the views of Riehl, Schlick, Russell, and Roy Wood Sellars among others ; and he then continues:.

Neuberbe regarded as a ground-breaking contribution to the debate over scientific realism within the analytical tradition. David Robb – – Philosophical Quarterly 47 Moreover, he edited such standard setting volumes as Readings in Philosophical Analysistogether with Wilfrid Sellars and Readings in the Philosophy of Sciencetogether with May Brodbeck.

In both cases, the realm of the meaningful is distinguished from these two objectionable regions.

The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’: The Essay and the Postscript

Jake marked it as to-read Jan 27, Relying on a frequency interpretation of probability, he argued that the limiting value of an infinite sequence can only be inferred mentsl, which in turn implied that probability is dependent on induction and not vice versa. On the other hand, however, Feigl is eager to demarcate his own position from overtly—metaphysically inspired—dualistic conceptions, such as parallelism or epiphenomenalism.

Had Feigl in his first publication on the mind-body problem in assumed that the relationship between the mental and the physical is that of a logical identity thereby implying that the language of psychology can be fully translated into the language of physics, viz. Alyssa Ney – – Analytic Philosophy 57 1: Contact Contact Us Help.


And in the social context, phywical traffic rules simply have to be obeyed if we are to survive as a society.

Mohmed Ismail is currently reading it Nov 18, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science has called the essay “a ‘super-colossal’ survey of the mind-body problem.

Personal StatementsNew York: Concerning the principle of induction itself, Feigl like his teacher Schlick saw no other possibility than to interpret it as a pragmatic or operational maxim.

The central core of the proposed solution rests upon the distinction between evidence and reference.

The Mental and the Physical

Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Overdetermination And The Exclusion Problem. In the case of the identity theory, this pragmatic justification is, as has been pointed out before, guided by the principle of parsimony.

The point is that qualia raw feels are, for Feigl, epistemologically privileged as compared to ordinary objects and the entities posited by science. There are no discussion topics on this book yet.